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“Don’t feel sorry for Grandpa: he’s in a better place.” Thus it is that heaven is 
used to take away the sting of death. But what are the moral implications of taking this 
seriously? In a nutshell, this chapter makes the following points. If universalism is true 
(that is, universal salvation: everybody who dies will make it to heaven) then it is not 
only the case that killing someone does not harm her, but more strongly, killing someone 
benefits her by cutting short the time she spends in an imperfect world that could be 
better spent in paradise. However, lest this be seen simply as an argument against 
universalism, according to the non-universalist doctrines that individuals can be damned 
by their sins, but that babies who die before sinning are heaven-bound, we have a strong 
altruistic reason (and plausibly a moral duty) to kill babies to save them from the worst 
possible fate of an infinity of suffering. So, if anything, the non-universalistic view is in a 
worse state than universalism, in that it presents early death as far better for the victim 
than continued life with the risk of damnation that will carry. Abortion, on this view, is a 
great good precisely because it stops a beating heart.1 
It appears, then, that two of the most popular views of heaven imply that killing 
benefits the person killed to such an extent that one should feel a little bit selfish if one 
does not kill those whom one loves most. This, of course, is an abhorrent conclusion. I 
will consider possible responses and show that it is a conclusion that is, however, 
surprisingly difficult to rebut. 
 The Epicurean challenge 
 
Most of us do not want to die. Even those whose lives are looked on with pity and 
horror by others typically seem attached to them. A desire not to continue one’s life is 
perhaps the worst indictment imaginable of its specificities. Skeptics believe that it is 
precisely this almost universal human aversion to death that is behind the idea of an 
afterlife; that the notion of heaven in particular is a product of wishful thinking. In the 
history of philosophy, however, there is an alternate salve for the mind troubled by 
mortality: the Epicurean argument that one’s death cannot harm one. In essence, Epicurus 
argued that my death cannot harm me because I won’t be around.2 That is, one can only 
be harmed when one exists, and after my death (just as much as before my inception) 
there is nothing that can be the subject of harm. A corollary of this argument is that one is 
not worse off ceasing to exist than one would be existing for all eternity in paradise, any 
more than I am now better off than the child who was not conceived because the sperm 
contributing half of my chromosomes got to my mother’s egg first. 
This sanguine view of one’s own extinction has met a critical response over the 
years, as one might imagine. Certainly a defender of mainstream Abrahamic views about 
the value to individuals (and cosmological importance) of heaven needs to rebut the 
Epicurean position. 
The standard contemporary response to Epicurus’ view has been that, even if one 
does not experience harm when one does not exist, one is nonetheless harmed by being 
deprived of experiences that one would have had, had one continued to exist.3  
The Epicurean challenge is that nothing can be better or worse for a non-existent 
being. If I don’t exist, I’m not getting less or more of anything and thus cannot suffer 
because of my death or benefit because of heaven. In response, contemporary anti-
Epicureans like Fred Feldman and Harry Silverstein argue that we should think instead in 
terms of a “life-to-life” comparison.4 To demonstrate that an early death harms one who 
suffers it, we compare her actual short life (which we can roughly evaluate in terms of 
units of happiness experienced) with the long life she would have had (and, in some close 
possible world, actually does have5) and we conclude that “more is better.”6 
This view, while it is not without its own problems, has clear intuitive advantages 
over Epicurus’s view. First, it allows that death can, and usually does, harm the one who 
dies. Second, it allows that there can be better and worse deaths, depending on how much 
life, and of what quality, one would have had had one not met one’s end. The extent to 
which one’s death harms one can be judged by comparing possible worlds. If I die very 
old and decrepit then it is unlikely that there will be a very close possible world in which 
both my life continues any great further length and that extra life is one that I experience 
as a net benefit. (Indeed, it is quite likely that there are close possible worlds where my 
life continues but is full of suffering, and thus my total life in the actual world ends up 
being better than the one in which my life is prolonged.) However, if I am struck down in 
my prime, it is much more likely that there will be close possible worlds where I (or my 
counterpart, depending on your view of possible worlds) continues to live for many 
largely pleasurable years. 
This approach is a sort of cost-benefit analysis of different possible modes of 
existence. However, introducing the possibility of heaven into the equation unbalances 
everything, just as it does in Pascal’s wager. There simply is no comparison between an 
infinity of bliss and any possible finite existence. To complicate matters further, there are 
at least two possible infinities involved in heavenly existence. The first (quantitative 
infinity) is the length of time one spends there. This means that even if each moment was 
only blissful to a finite degree, one would still eventually experience infinite bliss. But 
there is a second possible infinity, which is the bliss experienced at every moment 
(qualitative infinity). If every heavenly moment is infinitely rapturous, then every 
moment spent on earth is, according to the reasoning of the deprivation approach, a harm 
to the earthling. Everything is relative: according to the anti-Epicurean, one is harmed by 
death because one could have had more life, which means that one is harmed by moments 
spent on earth because one could have had infinitely blissful moments in heaven. 
Even if one does not experience a qualitative infinity of pleasure (or something 
more pure than pleasure, as communion with God might be thought to be) in every 
heavenly moment, at the very least each moment is heaven is much, much better for one 
than a moment spent on earth. And if universalism is true, then there is no risk of hell 
involved in death. Thus we can only conclude that we are greatly benefiting those we kill, 
and perhaps benefiting them infinitely. This is, to say the least, an alarming conclusion. 
What can be said to rebut it? 
 
Thou Shalt Not Kill 
 
It could be argued that whether or not killing benefits the victim is beside the 
point. God forbids us to kill, and that should be enough.7 However, this response is too 
simplistic. It has long been acknowledged that certain forms of killing are allowed, no 
matter what the apparent blanket condemnation of the commandment against it. Killing 
in self-defense and killing in a just war are acceptable even to most Catholics. Many self-
described conservative Christians also support the death penalty.8 Other believers when 
faced with the excruciating suffering of loved ones also support euthanasia.  
Furthermore, if we are thinking of the Bible as the source of this prohibition on 
killing, then we are forced to admit that we do not honor many other prohibitions 
contained therein, such as the commandments in Leviticus against eating shellfish, 
wearing shirts woven of two fabrics or sowing two different kinds of seeds in the same 
furrow.9 Modern interpreters of ancient religious texts almost universally justify ignoring 
a great number of the rules because they can offer reasons why they should not apply.  
So, that being said, how could one argue that the commandment against killing 
does not prohibit killing for the purpose of hurrying the deceased to heaven? Well, one 
approach would be to propose that if “death” on Earth is simply a means of entering 
heaven, then it is not really the kind of death that the commandment was meant to cover. 
This could go two possible ways: one could argue that the commandment is based on a 
misconception about death, not as a portal to paradise but as annihilation.10 But (this 
argument goes) now we know universalism is true, we know that killing is not wrong: 
why would a loving God force a human to endure the indignities of Earth if heaven 
awaits us all? Alternatively, one could argue that perhaps in the past it was possible to 
annihilate people, and this is what is prohibited, whereas today (perhaps because of the 
crucifixion, if one is Christian) death is no longer the end. While these arguments might 
sound a little specious, bear in mind that many interpreters now argue that a better 
translation of the commandment in question is “thou shalt not murder” because the 
Hebrew verb in question (רצח) has a wider range of meanings that are generally 
associated with destruction, whereas the killing we have in mind is premised on the idea 
that the so-called victim survives it, and indeed thrives as a result. 
Finally, even if the Bible’s injunction really does prohibit the kind of killing that 
sends its so-called-victim straight to heaven, this need not prevent us violating that rule 
for the good of the person we wish to usher into Elysium. If universalism is true, what’s 
the cost in disobeying God? God forgives all and welcomes all into heaven on this view, 
so violating a rule in the Bible, especially for the most altruistic of reasons, has no 
downside. 
 
Autonomy vs. Paternalism 
 
Even if we allow that killing someone is certain to make them better off, one 
could still object that this is not the killer’s decision to make. This is an extreme form of 
paternalism and a violation of the autonomy of the person killed. Ethicists as diverse as 
Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill11 have argued that paternalism is morally 
impermissible.  
 Several things can be said in response to this attempt to render altruistic 
killing untenable. First, certain paternalistic acts meet with almost universal approval. If I 
see you about to step out into traffic, only an extreme libertarian would condemn me for 
preventing you. This is obviously so if you are unaware of the risk,12 but most would take 
it to be true even if you intend to commit suicide.13 Even supporters of assisted suicide 
are very cautious about the circumstances in which they approve of it: only those who 
can present level-headed rational reasons for why their life should end and/or are in 
obvious excruciating distress should be candidates.14 
 Furthermore, giving life-changing gifts is not seen as morally forbidden. If 
somebody anonymously donates $1M to a complete stranger, this is not taken to violate 
the recipient’s autonomy, despite the huge disruption this would no doubt cause to her 
life (assuming she is not already obscenely wealthy). And isn’t going to heaven the 
greatest gift possible? If in response the objection came that one can refuse or give away 
the $1M but once one is in heaven, one can’t return, I would suggest that this betrays an 
ambivalence about heaven unbecoming to the true believer. Why would one ever wish to 
leave heaven once one had entered it? If such a thing were indeed possible then heaven is 
not as heavenly as we have been led to believe (and God would be entrapping all of the 
people who die of natural causes). 
 Finally, even if we were convinced that both that paternalism is so wrong 
that it renders impermissible dispatching autonomous agents to heaven, this prohibition 
would not cover at least two classes of killings. Paternalism is so named because it is 
acting towards an autonomous agent in a parent-like manner ill befitting his ability to 
decide for himself. If, however, the “victim” is an infant, then paternalism is not only not 
immoral, it is entirely appropriate. No parent is criticized for inoculating her child despite 
vocal objections, and the benefit of immunity to any disease is puny in comparison with 
the bounty of heaven. And, of course, one cannot use paternalism to argue against 
suicide, because one is deciding for oneself, which is the essence of autonomy. This can 
be extended to assisted suicide as well, so if one is careful to share the good news with 
one’s intended “victim,” and one is particularly persuasive, that category could include a 




I said above that if universalism is right, then even if God does forbid us to kill, 
we can know that we will end up in heaven anyway, as will anybody killed.16 There 
appears to be no possible downside to killing on this view, and conversely, minimal 
upside to living. But what if universalism is a mistaken view? Let us suppose that instead 
of universal salvation, both the following traditionally widely accepted principles apply: 
 
Desert-based Postmortem Destination (DPS): 
One’s afterlife depends on one’s earthly behavior, with Hell a possible 
destination for those who do wrong.17 
 
Traditional Punishment model of Hell (PMH): 
Hell is a place of eternal torment that one cannot escape.18 
 
If these principles were true (and universalism false), what effect would this have 
on our calculus of killing? Well, for one thing, one would be taking a double risk in 
dispatching someone. First, one would be risking eternal damnation for oneself, 
particularly if violating the commandment against killing is enough to ensure for oneself 
a fiery fate. But second, one would be taking the risk that the person one killed would 
also end up in hell. Perhaps that person is currently in a sinful state and hence hellbound, 
but that, had she not been killed, she would have performed some act or penance and 
redeemed herself, so that on dying at a later date she would be saved. 
Certainly this possibility would both make killing much more costly for the killer 
and reduce the number of people that it would be beneficent to kill. But it does not mean 
that no killing is justified. Indeed, if hell is a possible destination for one’s loved ones, 
then one is under a duty to do everything in one’s power to ensure that they do not end up 
there. And one sure method is to kill them while they are definitely in a pure state. One 
could in fact say that taking the risk that they sin and then die accidentally when they are 
out of one’s sight would be intolerably cavalier, because it would ensure for one’s 
beloved an eternity of the worst possible suffering. 
This raises the question of when one can know for sure that one’s loved one is 
sin-free. Obviously this depends on the content of one’s religion. If confession washes 
away sins, then immediately after confession would be a safe bet. But I suggest that the 
most certain way to ensure purity is if one’s loved one is a child as yet unborn, or at the 
very least, a child that has not yet developed the ability to act intentionally (which is for 
most believers a requirement for sin19). Thus abortion would be an act done for the 
benefit of the one aborted, ensuring that they never even risk sin, and thus are guaranteed 
salvation. 
Before addressing possible problems with the above suggestion, it must be noted 
that such measures would not ensure safety for the killer, who presumably sins by the act 
of killing. The killer might have either to hope that God in fact shares his consequentialist 
reasoning and accepts altruistically motivated killing as the good deed it is intended to be, 
or that confession (followed immediately by suicide) can wipe away even the sin of 
killing one’s loved ones. But suppose one will be consigned to hell if one kills one’s 
loved ones, even if one knows for certain that by so doing one will ensure for them a 
place in Paradise. I suggest that in these circumstances, the altruistic killer who is intent 
on saving her children from the risk of hell at the cost of the certainty of her own 
damnation should be seen as heroic rather than contemptible. She is making the ultimate 
(really ultimate – much more than simply ceasing to exist) sacrifice for the infinite 
benefit of those she loves. 
 
No heaven for the aborted? 
 
So we are considering whether or not abortion is not just not immoral, but rather 
the best thing that one could do for one’s child.20 The above reasoning assumes the 
following principle:  
 
Initial purity (IP): 
One is (a) sinless and (b) heaven-bound from one’s inception until one is old 
enough to perform an intentional sinful act. 
 
But what if that’s mistaken? One might believe, as many have through the ages that we 
carry original sin and that babies who die unbaptized will go to hell.21 But I believe this 
view has lost favor for good reason. We do not believe that children carry the sins of their 
parents and can justly be punished for wrongs they had no part in. And now we know that 
many fertilized eggs spontaneously abort,22 we are aware of just how many children 
would be filling out the legions of the damned.  
However, perhaps we could accept IP (a) but still deny IP (b) if there are afterlife 
alternatives beyond heaven and hell. And two at least have some theological 
respectability: limbo and purgatory. 
Medieval Christian theologians argued that there was a limbus infantium (“limbo 
of the infants”) just for children who die before being baptized, precisely because they 
die in original sin. However, there is no official Catholic doctrine on this matter, and in 
2007 Pope Benedict XVI endorsed a document that concluded that this fate did not await 
the unbaptized.23 One can see why: this limbo is a lesser circle of hell, and although it is 
thought of as free from torturous punishments (it may even involve a form of happiness), 
it denies its denizens the full beatific vision of God that those in Heaven receive, and the 
God that would consign guiltless babes to such a fate, with no possibility of exit, seems 
too callous to contemplate. 
Purgatory is a more palatable destination, as it is traditionally a place where one 
can be purified and then exit heavenwards.24 But then, if purgatory is a risk-free 
temporary stopping place where the infant can develop but not sin, the calculation that 
one should abort to save one’s child the risk of hell still applies. So it seems that the 
afterlife alternatives have not added anything to the picture. 
 
Earth necessary for soul-making 
 
The calculation of the altruistic killer assumes that any time spent in heaven 
trumps any time spent on earth by a possibly infinite amount. But if that is so then it 
raises the more fundamental problem that earth itself seems to be pointless. Elsewhere25 I 
have called this the problem of the Apparent Pointlessness of Earth (APE) and indeed, 
the issue of heaven providing a motivation for altruistic killing is just an instance of this 
more basic problem created by the existence of heaven. Why would a loving God have 
created earth at all if his creatures could instead have been placed directly in heaven? 
 One seemingly powerful answer to this question can be found in John 
Hick’s idea that earth is a place for “soul-making”.26 This was put forward as a response 
to the problem of evil, the challenge of explaining how the existence of an all-powerful, 
all-good God, both able to prevent suffering and motivated to do so, is nonetheless 
consistent with the profusion of suffering we see around us.27 Hick’s response is 
essentially that souls worthy of heaven can only result from the experience of genuine 
moral dilemmas which themselves cannot exist in a perfect world. This theodicy provides 
a rationale for earth as a necessary proving ground to be ready for, and worthy of, 
heaven.28 
 This view raises many questions, however. If this earth is a proving 
ground, it seems like it is a vastly unequal one. Children can be born in such poverty that 
they have only evils to choose amongst, whereas the very wealthy can be protected from 
the possibility of serious sinning. And surely many fail the test. What happens to those 
who die without fully forming their souls? If they go to hell, then the inequality seems a 
horrific injustice. If they go to purgatory to complete their training, then we have not 
provided an airtight justification for the existence of the earth, because its function can be 
performed by purgatory, which, presumably, is a place where one completes the job of 
soul-making infallibly. Hick himself was a universalist, which seems rather at odds with 
the soul-making project. It suggests either that one can live eternally in heaven with an 
incomplete soul or that one can finish making one’s soul in heaven. If the former, then 
either some eternal heavenly existences are worse than others (an odd view of heaven) or 
that soul-making is redundant. If the latter, then again, why do we need the earth? 
Perhaps Hick can say that any amount of time on earth is enough: one just needs to face 
one true moral quandary in the face of possible evil to acquire the tools to complete soul-
making in the afterlife, but that one dilemma is essential, and so by extension is the earth, 
the only venue that offers it. But this, of course, leaves those who die as young infants 
again languishing in limbo, which we have already dismissed as unacceptable. So Hick’s 
“soul-making” view does not, in fact, offer a solution to APE. Besides the fact that it is 
never satisfactorily explained why humans have to go through the uncertain processes of 
making their souls rather than being created perfect (presumably God was always perfect, 
and he is the acme of existence), either the earth is not the only (or indeed the best) place 
for soul-making, or, again, the multitudes who died before getting the chance to make 




But what if there is no heaven? Even the most ardent of the faithful must have 
some nagging doubt, and perhaps that is enough to blunt any arguments in favor of 
hurrying on death as a passage to paradise. “We’ll find out eventually, so what’s the 
hurry?” There is also the possibility that, while we are right about there being both 
paradise and inferno, we are mistaken about the qualifications for each and as a result, 
about the destination of our putative victims. Surely this is sufficient disincentive to kill 
our loved ones. Well, I certainly hope so. But this is an odd argument for a true believer 
to give. It is an argument for passivity with essentially universal application. It is possible 
that God favors only devout followers of a tiny sect of snake handlers, and that unless 
you commit yourself completely to their strict and particular credo, you are guaranteed 
hellbound. Furthermore, it is not as if we can be precise about weighting the probabilities 
when it comes to eschatological matters, so we cannot say for certain that this is less 
likely than more widely-accepted possibilities. (Indeed, were we to do so, no minority 
religion would ever get off the ground.) Attempting to avoid committing to a particular 
vision of the divine in the hopes of covering our bets would lead us to paralysis, except 
for the possibility that that is what angers the true God the most.  
 “But this is a life and death matter! We’re talking about taking lives, not 
about which day the Sabbath falls on or whether one should wear shoes in one’s house of 
worship!” Again, this is a response that reveals an irresolution about one’s faith. If one 
truly believes that death is not the end but is rather a gateway to the eternal life that is the 
entire point of one’s existence, then death should hold no sting – quite the contrary. To 
view it otherwise is to betray one’s inability to transcend one’s earthbound viewpoint, 
and by extension, one’s essential pettiness.  
 Subjective vs. Objective 
 
It seems inarguable that time spent in heaven would be experienced by an 
individual as far more rewarding than time spent on earth. Indeed it seems likely that any 
time in heaven would be more rewarding than a full lifetime on earth. But perhaps that is 
not the only relevant concern. Perhaps one could argue that there is a non-subjective good 
that needs to be taken into account that is independent of any feelings or emotions 
experienced by God’s creatures. To give an analogy: Christians argue that Jesus’s 
crucifixion was a great good, despite the agony he is said to have experienced. Maybe, 
then, our painful existences on earth have a value that has nothing to do with those 
experiences, and that cannot be produced by a life solely spent in heaven. So, while we 
might like it better if we got to go straight to heaven without having to trudge through this 
vale of tears, what we like is not all that matters in the grand scheme of things. 
 As usual, there are several things to say in response to this suggestion. But 
the first is a question: exactly what might this objective good be, that has nothing to do 
with the experienced happiness of God’s creatures? James Sennett suggests that time on 
an earth that allows evil is essential for the later-redeemed to have freedom in heaven.29 
Sennett’s position has similarities with Hick’s soul-making theodicy, which we have 
already dismissed, but ignoring the specific challenges faced by Sennett’s or Hick’s 
arguments, even though the rewards of earthly existence are not meted out in happiness, 
it is still that case that both arguments rest on the idea that the benefit of going through 
the experiences that earth offers is supposed to accrue to the individual who has those 
experiences (and makes choices accordingly). But in this section we are working on the 
assumption that the benefit might never apply to those specific individuals, but instead 
are objective goods. 
 A possible candidate for such an objective good might be the realization 
of justice. Thus, for example, while it is a very bad thing for the denizens of hell that they 
are there, it is a good thing in that their punishment is achieving the objective goal of 
achieving justice in the universe. But besides the fact that no universalist could accept 
such an argument, this implies further that it is better that individuals exist, commit 
crimes, and suffer for it eternally than that they do not exist at all. And by extension, a 
universe that consists simply of earthly sinners and those in hell, with no redeemed, 
would also be better, simply because justice is served. If, on the other hand, adding 
individuals who do good and are rewarded for it to this picture makes it a better world, 
then it seems that justice as an objective goal with objective worth independently of the 
experience of those who experience it being meted on them can be outweighed by the 
good of placing people in a blissful eternal environment. 
 There is a deeper worry with this approach of severing the good achieved 
by one’s stay on earth from any good experienced by any particular individual. If it 
indeed the case that an objective good can outweigh the experienced happiness of God’s 
creatures, then how are we to know that heaven is pleasurable? Maybe communion with 
God is agonizing! Why not? If our happiness can be outweighed (in the way that this 
approach requires, to justify our earthly sufferings) then why can’t it be eternally 
outweighed? Of course, knowing that heaven is agonizing would definitely do the job of 
discouraging altruistic killings, but at what cost to the overall appeal of religion? 
 Maybe the response to this worry is to say that, no, subjective experience 
cannot be entirely discounted, and that is why we will get our reward in the bliss that 
heaven will bring, but that, just as you cannot have your dessert until you have eaten your 
vegetables, heavenly bliss cannot be experienced without a prior earthly existence. 
 However, this move is again rife with flaws. Apart from the restrictions it 
places on God’s omnipotence (in that it insists that God lacks the power to grant us the 
good of heaven without the lesser good of earth), it leaves unexplained any explanation 
for this restriction. And familiar candidates such as “you can’t know what pleasure is 
until you’ve experienced pain” have familiar problems: what about the spontaneously 
aborted fetuses? Is their heavenly existence deprived of pleasure? Are humans better off 
than God (either the Father of Christianity or the God of Judaism or Islam) who has never 




In the foregoing I have mostly assumed IP, that is, that heaven is the default 
destination at our inception, so that tiny infants who die before they are capable of sin 
will automatically end up there. I rejected the idea that we are born in original sin for the 
reason that this would be horribly unfair for those infants who die of natural causes 
before they are capable of redeeming themselves. But suppose we reconsider rejecting IP, 
and instead of assuming that we are born pure and only sin through free actions, we are 
instead born impure and must redeem ourselves to be saved, but then we add to this 
forbidding picture the idea that those who die before being redeemed get a second 
chance, perhaps by their souls being given different bodies. This would have the 
implication that the best that altruistic killing would do would be to send one’s infant 
back to the starting line, so to speak. However, let us think about what this is saying to 
the grieving parents who have lost a child: your child is now someone else’s child, and 
they get to raise that child, and possibly abuse him or her. If you are lucky, the child will 
eventually meet you in Paradise, but you will have to share them with the people who 
raised them, if they acknowledge you at all. Furthermore, this suggestion is certainly a 
novel one, with no basis in church teachings, and it might smack too much of Buddhist or 
Hindu notions of reincarnation for followers of the Abrahamic faiths to find acceptable. 
Certainly a more canon suggestion would be purgatory, but I have already addressed how 




My argument starts as a challenge for universalism. If heaven is as heavenly as it 
is supposed to be, then we are relatively harmed (perhaps infinitely) for every instant we 
spend here rather than in heaven, and if universalism is true, not committing suicide 
becomes essentially irrational. And further, not ushering our loved ones to the Promised 
Land shows at best self-indulgence and at worst negligence or even cruelty. 
 However, this problem for universalism should not be taken as an 
argument for more traditional views of the afterlife, where hell is also an option, and 
one’s destination is determined by one’s behavior on earth (DPS). For, as we have seen, 
there is a possibly greater incentive to kill one’s loved ones if one thinks one can save 
them from a hellish destination (PMH) by so doing. 
 Thus my initial challenge broadens to present a problem for both 
universalism and its most popular alternative. Both appear to imply that at least some 
(and possibly many) altruistic killings are justified. More fundamentally, the existence of 
heaven raises APE, which is structurally parallel to the problem of evil. Just as the 
existence of evil appears incompatible with the existence of a God who is both all-loving 
and all-powerful, the existence of earth seems incompatible with the co-existence of such 
a God and heaven. If indeed heaven is where we are supposed to be, and where we will 
spend an infinity of time, then not only is the time spent on earth comparatively 
unpleasant, and spent in comparatively unimportant pursuits, it is also effectively 0% of 
our existence, and thus for it to have such a massive influence over the rest of our 
lifespans (as it would if DPS is true) seems positively bizarre. So why have it at all? The 
only reason this question does not occur to more people is, presumably, that we are used 
to an earthly existence. But of course we are used to suffering, but that doesn’t stop the 
existence of suffering prompting the problem of evil. 
 I conclude with what I take to be the best reason why we should not kill 
our loved ones to usher them into heaven: if there was a heaven, we wouldn’t be here in 
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1. To advocate for abortion, on this view, would not be “pro-death,” it would be “pro-
eternal-life.” 
 
 2. “Accustom yourself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply 
awareness, and death is the privation of all awareness... Death…is nothing to us, 
seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It 
is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the 
dead exist no longer,” Epicurus (341-270 BCE) Letter to Menoeceus, translated by 
Robert Drew Hicks, http://classics.mit.edu/Epicurus/menoec.html. 
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